FEDERAL INCOME TAX-"TAx HOME" DOCTRINE AFFIRMED;
TOUR OF DUTY NOT ALLOWED TO
DEDUCT COST OF MEALS AS AN "AWAY FROM HOME" TRAVEL
EXPENSE. Commissioner v. Stidger (U.S. 1967).
TAXPAYER ON OVERSEAS

On October 1, 1957, Marine Captain Howe A. Stidger was transferred to Iwakuni, Japan. Since dependents were prohibited from
accompanying Marine Corps personnel to Japan, Stidger's wife and
children remained in California. On his 1958 tax return, the taxpayer
claimed a deduction of $650 representing the cost of meals for ten
months spent at Iwakuni. This deduction was disallowed by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the grounds that it did not
meet the requirements of Section 162 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (travel expenses while away from home). The Commissioner viewed petitioner's duty station in Iwakuni as his "home"
during the ten months in question, and concluded, therefore, that the
taxpayer had not been "away from home" when he had incurred the
expenses for meals. The Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner's
decision. 2 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, rejecting the Commissioner's definition of home, and holding that "home" is the taxpayer's place of residence and not his place of business. 3 The Supreme
Court, in a six to three decision, held, reversed: The taxpayer's home
for tax purposes was his military post of duty. Commissioner v.
Stidger, 386 U.S. 287 (1967).
The holding of the Supreme Court was based on three grounds:
(1) a long-standing interpretation by the Commissioner, receiving
judicial approval, that one's "tax home" is his place of business; (2)
acquiescence by Congress in this "tax home" doctrine; and (3)
intent of Congress to relieve fully, by special allowances, the burden
of added expense to military personnel.4
Prior to 1920, the Commissioner took the position that only
actual transportation expenses were deductible as travel expenses, 5
1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954. § 162. TRADE OR BUSINESS EXPENSES.

(a) In general.
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging
other than amounts which are lavish and extravagant under the circumstances)
while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business ....
2 Howe A. Stidger, 40 T.C. 896 (1963).
8 Stidger v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1965).
4 386 U.S. 287, 296 (1967).

5 See S. 1048, 1 CuM. BULL. 101 (1919). Transportation expenses did not include
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and that those expenses for meals and lodging incident to travel
were not deductible. 6 In 1920, the Commissioner expanded the deduction to include food and lodging expenses, while away from home,
to the extent that they exceeded the taxpayer's normal household
expenses for housing and feeding his family.7 Congress reacted to
this restrictive interpretation by inserting the words "including the
entire amount expended for meals and lodging while away from
home" to broaden the travel expense provision of the 1918 Revenue
Act." Additionally, the Commissioner interpreted "home" as one's
place of business under this amendment.
The Tax Court approved the Commissioner's interpretation in the
case of Mort L. Bixler--an itinerant fair manager who, the court
held, was not away from home while incurring expenses at his
remote place of business. The court rationalized the "tax home"
doctrine as an implementation of the concept that one cannot choose
to live far from his work and deduct the resulting expenses. 10
A majority of the circuit courts concur on the "tax home" doctrine." However, judicial doubt and disagreement as to the applicacommuting to and from one's place of business on the grounds that these were personal expenses to be borne by the taxpayer. The definition of a tax deductible travel
expense therefore excluded any travel expense unless incurred while away from one's
place of business and in the pursuit of that trade or business.
6 Treas. Reg. 45, § 292, T.D. 2831, 21 TREAs. DEC. INT. 1Ev. 241 (1919). "If
the trip is on business, the railroad fares become business instead of personal expenses,
but the meals and lodging continue to be living expenses and are not deductible in
computing net income."
7 T.D. 3101, 3 Cum. BULL. 191 (1920). The taxpayer had to substantiate the
deduction by attaching the following mass of paperwork to his income tax return:
(1) the nature of the business in which engaged; (2) number of days away from home
during the calendar year on account of business; (3) number of members in taxpayer's
family dependent on him for support; (4) average monthly expense incident to meals
and lodging for the entire family, including taxpayer himself when at home; (5)
average monthly expense incident to meals and lodging when at home if taxpayer has
no family; (6) total amount of expenses incident to meals and lodging while absent
from home on business during tax year; (7) total amount of excess expenditures
incident to meals and lodging while traveling on business and claimed as a deduction;
and (8) total amount of other expenses incident to travel and claimed as a deduction.
8 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136 § 214(a), 42 Stat. 239 ("traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home
in the pursuit of a trade or business").
9 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927).
10 Id. at 1184. The Commissioner concurred in a revenue ruling clearly applying the
"tax home" doctrine to all taxpayers. VII-2 CuM. BULL. 128 (1928).
1 Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 291 n.11 (1967). Sec also 4A J.
ARTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 25, 337 (1966) [hereinafter cited

as MaRTENS]. The Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have approved
the Commissioner's interpretation. The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth generally disagree,
while the First and Tenth Circuits have not passed on the question.
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tion of the doctrine is far from inconsiderable. In Walter F. Brown,"2
the Tax Court decided that only one of two places of business could
be considered the taxpayer's "tax home"; thus, one's home for tax
purposes was his principal place of business. Another inroad into
the "tax home" doctrine was formulated by the Second Circuit in
Coburn v. Commissioner.s3 The court held that even if New York
actor Charles Coburn had spent a majority of the taxable year in
California making movies, California would not be considered his
"tax home" if the duration of the employment had been only temporary.
The Commissioner has strictly limited the scope of the word temporary, 14 so that the "tax home" moves from the taxpayer's principal
place of employment to his new place of employment if the period
spent away from the former can be termed indefinite.'5 This temporary-indefinite test is essentially an aid in determining the location
of the taxpayer's principal place of business. A finding by the Commissioner that a change of one's place of business is temporary does
not affect the taxpayer's principal place of business. If the change is
deemed of indefinite duration, however, the principal place of business is moved to the taxpayer's new place of employment, thus preventing him from being away from his "tax home," and thereby
precluding the "away from home" deduction.
Captain Stidger, at the Tax Court level, contended that, since his
tenure at Iwakuni had only been for 15 months, the absence from his
"tax home" had been temporary.' 6 Both the Tax Court and the
12

13 B.T.A. 832 (1928).

13 138 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1943).

14 See James R. Whitaker, 24 T.C. 750, 753 (1955), where the taxpayer had to
leave his family and go to Thule, Greenland, for 222 days to work on a secret army
project. In throwing out the contention that his employment was temporary, the Tax
Court stated: "The employment of petitioner in Thule, Greenland may have lacked
permanence but.., it was not the kind of employment to be considered temporary in
nature." See also Floyd Garlock, 34 T.C. 611, 616 (1960). Here a construction worker
who relied on issuance of a weekly temporary work permit actually worked for two
years away from his residence. The Tax Court in disallowing the deduction stated:
"Petitioner's employment may have lacked real permanence but the mere absence of
permanence does not necessarily imply that degree of temporariness which would allow
deductibility of traveling expenses."
15 See Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960) (where the taxpayer
was reassigned to a job 117 miles from his residence, and remained there over a year
without knowing how long the change would be in effect); M. J. Carrol, 20 T.C.
382 (1953) (where the taxpayer left his family in Ohio to work for the War
Department as a tax and banking consultant to the South Korean government for -a
year).
16 40 T.C. at 899.
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Supreme Court answered this contention by referring to the taxpayer's military orders, which had called the transfer a permanent
change of duty. Both courts also relied on Bercaw v. Commissioner,'7
where an Army officer had attempted to deduct his food and lodging
expenses while away from his residence. The deduction was disallowed because the expenses had been incurred at his permanent
8
duty station which had been his "home" for tax purposes.'
The Ninth Circuit, in rejecting the "tax home" doctrine, has discarded the temporary-indefinite test.'9 In Harvey v. Commissioner,20
the taxpayer's new job had been by its nature indefinite in duration.
Application of the temporary-indefinite test caused Harvey's "tax
home" to shift from its former location, near his residence, to his
new job site, located some 117 miles away. Since the taxpayer had
not been "away from home," the deductions for meals, lodging, and
travel were denied. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it was unreasonable to expect an employee on an indefinite assignment to move his
residence to his new place of business, unless there was a reasonable
expectation on his part that he would be working at that location
for a "long period of time."'" In Stidger, the Ninth Circuit clearly
17 165 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1948).
18 Rev. Rul. 55-571, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 44. This ruling restated the rule of
Bercaw, that a military man's permanent duty station is his "home" for tax purposes.
It considered a naval officer's permanent duty station to be the home port of the officer's
ship, thereby allowing a deduction while away from the home port, but still on board

the officer's duty station, his ship. Stidger thought of his own situation at Iwakuni as
"directly analogous to that of a naval officer on a ship at sea for an extended period
of time." The Commissioner distinguished Stidger from the naval officer by using the
home port logic, and in oral argument stated that, at any rate, the Commissioner was
reexamining his stand toward naval officers. 386 U.S. at 296 n.22. In November, 1967,
the Commissioner issued a ruling that an officer assigned to permanent duty aboard a
ship with regular living and eating accomodations, has his "home" aboard that ship
for tax purposes, thereby removing the inconsistent treatment complained of in Stidger.
REv.RUL. 67-438, 1967 INT. Ruv. BULL. No. 1967-50 at 8.
19 See Wallace v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1944). There, a resident
of San Francisco was allowed to deduct the expenses for meals and lodging while
making movies in Hollywood. The Ninth Circuit stated:
[T]he Tax Court . . . has, we think, invaded the domain of Congress in

construing the term "home" as used in the statute under consideration as
meaning the taxpayer's place of business, "employment or the post or station
at which he is employed."
Id. at 410.
20 283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960).
21 Id. at 495. What constitutes a "long period of time" would vary with the facts
and circumstances of each case. In a subsequent case, consistent with ]Irallace and
Harvey, the Ninth Circuit has decided that a taxpayer's inability to live near his job
(Atomic Energy Commission test site) was a valid ground for a deduction of the
resulting cost of his transportation, food and lodging. Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d
221 (9th Cir. 1962). Since the purpose of the "away from home" clause is to remedy
the duplicitous expenses of a business and residential home, the lack of the latter is
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rejected the Commissioner's rule that "home" meant "principal place
of business," holding that home should mean the taxpayer's residence,
with the requirement that the taxpayer move as dose to his place of
employment as possible.22 The Supreme Court's opinion in Stidger
did not refer to the rationale behind the Ninth Circuit's rejection of
the "tax home" doctrine. Instead the Court gave great weight to the
fact that in Stidger, and earlier in Bercaw, the taxpayer had undergone a permanent change in his place of employment. Thus a direct
affirmation of the temporary-indefinite rule was avoided.
The Stidger Court apparently also relied on congressional acquiescence in the "tax home" doctrine. 8 In George W. Lindsay,2 4 the Tax
Court had held the District of Columbia to be a Congressman's "tax
home." Subsequently, Congress amended the travel-expense section
of the Code in 1952 to make a Congressman's home, for the purpose
of the travel deduction, the place of residence in his congressional
district. 28 Since "Congress did not respond to this ruling by amending
the statutory language generally to provide that 'home' was intended
to be synonymous with 'residence' but instead merely carved out an
exception to cover the special travel expense problems inherent in
sufficient to deny the deduction. James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1962).
Even one Tax Court judge, in a 1963 decision, adopted the basic idea behind the
Ninth Circuit stand:
It is now axiomatic that the "away from home" provision of the statute is to
mitigate the burden of the taxpayer forced by his business or employment to
pay the expenses of maintaining two places of abode.
Leo M. Verner, 39 T.C. 749, 754 (1963).
22 355 F.2d at 299-300.
23 The opinion appears somewhat ambiguous at this point. Chief Justice Warren,
writing for the majority, stated that:
[Ilt is not necessary for us to decide here whether this congressional action
(or inaction) constitutes approval and adoption of the Commissioner's interpretation of "home" in all its myriad applications since, in the context of
the military taxpayer, the Commissioner's position has a firmer foundation.
386 U.S. at 292.
Although not deiding approval and adoption of the tax home doctrine by Congress,
Chief Justice Warren, in summing up the reasons for reversing the Ninth Circuit, did
conclude that Congress had knowledge of the interpretation. This implies congressional
acquiescence which was the point the Commissioner was trying to make.
24 34 B.T.A. 840 (1936).
25 In 1952 Congress, passed the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act ch. 598,
66 Stat. 464, 467 (1952), containing an amendment (section 23(a)(1) (A)) to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939. This amendment exists today in section 162 (a) of the
1954 Code immediately following the "away from home" clause:
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the place of residence of a Member of
Congress . . .within the State, congressional district, Territory, or possession
which he represents in Congress shall be considered his home, but amounts
expended by such Members within each taxable year for living expenses shall
not be deductible for income tax purposes in excess of $3000.
Iir, REV. Cope of 1954, 162(a) (emphasis added).
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service as a national legislator," 2 the Supreme Court in the instant
case accepted the Commissioner's view that the amendment, enacted
with knowledge of the Commissioner's interpretation, was congressional acquisescence in that interpretation. The validity of this argument is questionable. The legislative history of the amendment indicates that the "tax home" doctrine was understood by Congress to
be a judicial discrimination against Congressmen,27 and that the
amendment was not carving out an exception, but rectifying an existing injustice to Congressmen ;28 now Congressmen would be able
to deduct their away-from-home expenses in the same manner as
other taxpayers.2 Actually, the Commissioner in Lindsay was consistently applying the rule to Congressmen, which was, and still is,
applicable to all other taxpayers, namely, that one's place of business
is his "home" for tax purposes. The congressional amendment, therefore, did not correct a discrimination but created one.
The last ground relied upon in Stidger, for disallowing the tax386 U.S. at 291.
The proposed change was known as the McCormack Amendment. Representative
McCormack, the prime mover behind it's passage, obviously thought the Tax Court
had "invaded the domain of Congress" (see note 19 supra) when he referred to Lindsay
on the House floor:
The Tax Court has held that the home of a Member of Congress for tax
purposes is the District of Columbia on the theory that this is the business
location, post or station of Members of Congress. On this reasoning-which
is judicial legislation if I have even seen it-the expenses of a Member of
Congress while attending a session of Congress were held not to be deductible.
98 CONG. REc. 5280 (1952)
(remarks of Representative McCormad:) (emphasis
added). See I J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN's LEGISLATivE HISTORY OF FED. INC. AND EXCESS
PRoFrrS TAx LAws, 1953-1939 1300 (1954) [hereinafter cited as SEIDMANS].
28 Representative McCormack read from a General Counsel Memorandum, G.C.M.
23672, 1943 Cum. BULL. 66, to illustrate that ordinary taxpayers can render services to
the Government on a "substantially continuous" basis without having their "tax home"
changed to Washington, D.C. He neglected to point out, however, that this memorandum referred only to "dollar-a-year" men, individuals who donated their services to
the Government during World War II and were consequently given a tax "break"
by allowing a deduction of their food and lodging expenses while working in Washing26
27

ton.
29

As explained by Representative McCormack on the house floor:
This amendment simply gives to Members of Congress that which every other
person in this country has; a determination legally that our home, where we
live, is our place of residence for taxpaying purposes, instead of its being the
District of Columbia. It gives to us the right to deduct business expenses-that is all-in connection with the performance of our duties as Members of
Congress. That is the same right that any other businessman has, and which
he should have.
The purpose and effect of this amendment is to give to Members of Congress
under the tax laws the same privileges that everybody else has.
There was an uncertainty as to the construction of the organic law some
years ago. This amendment clarifies that. It seems to be only equity and justice
that we give to ourselves what everyone else justifiably receives.

99 CONG. REC. 7003-04 (1953) (remarks.of Representative McCormack). See SgiDMANS

at 1297.
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payer's deduction, did not concern the "tax home" doctrine. The
Court noted that
[u]nderlying the system of special allowances is congressional
recognition of the fact that military life poses unusual financial
problems. The system is designed to provide complete and direct
relief from such problems as opposed to the incomplete and indirect
relief which an income tax deduction affords to a civilian business
travelerao
The special allowance referred to was the tax-free subsistence allowance received monthly by Stidger. One of Justice Douglas' major
criticisms in his strong dissent was that the petitioner received this
allowance, whether he was living at home or traveling abroad. Therefore, contrary to the thoughts of the majority, "[t]here was no increase to help defray the increased expenses incurred by him while
required to live away from his family." 3 ' The majority, however, did
not depend solely on the existence of Stidger's subsistence allowance
to substantiate their contention. In 1963, Congress enacted a measure
designed to provide direct relief to the families of servicemen, who,
due to service exigencies, were prevented from living at or near their
duty station.3 2 This measure was not in existence at the time Stidger
was stationed in Japan, but it nevertheless lent support to the argument that Congress intended to relieve the family military man of
the burden of maintaining two homes, 33 and thus intended this relief
to preempt the "away from home" deduction.
Stidger, therefore, denies military personnel the traveling expense
deduction while maintaining the status quo of the "tax home"
doctrine as applicable to a civilian taxpayer.3 4 Despite almost unani30 386 U.S. at 295.
81 Id. at 299. Strangely. enough it is the Commissioner himself who has provided the

clearest statement in support of Stidger's cause. "The basic allowances for subsistence

and quarters are granted by law independently of whether the member is required to

travel and are entirely unrelated to expenses incurred in travel." Rev. Rul. 55-572,

1955-2 CuM. BULL. 45, 46.
32 Family Separation Allowance, § 11, 37 U.S.C. 427 (1963). This measure, if in
force in 1958, would have given Captain Stidger an extra $30 per month.
83 See S. REP. No. 387, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.; U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. Naws, 912,
925 (1963).
34 The Supreme Court had two opportunities before Stidger to decide the meaning of
"home." The first was Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946). There the
Court formulated a three step test to determine deductibility of travel expenses. The
expenses must be: (1) reasonable and necessary; (2) incurred while away from home;

and (3) incurred in the pursuit of the taxpayer's trade or business. The Court expressly
declined to define the words "away from home" but predicated the denial of the
deduction on the third step, in that the taxpayer's decision to live far away from his

employment was a personal one and the resultant expenses were not therefore incurred
in the pursuit of his trade or business.
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mous disapproval by legal writers, " the "tax home" doctrine causes
few unfair results. As long as the time away from one's principal
place of business is not shorter than overnight 6 and generally no
longer than a year,3 7 the taxpayer will receive the travel expense
deduction. It is only when the period of absence away from one's
principal place of business can be termed indefinite by the Commissioner that the "tax home" doctrine renders a harsh result. The more
indefinite the taxpayer's period of employment away from his residence, the less likely he will want to uproot his family and move to
the place of indefinite employment, even though the indefiniteness
will cause the Commissioner's rule to deprive the taxpayer of a
deduction. The Ninth Circuit solves the problem by determining
whether, under the facts and circumstances of each case, a taxpayer
should reasonably be expected to move his family to his new place of
business. Yet, where is the division between a reasonable and a
purely personal decision not to move? This is the question an Internal
Revenue Agent is required to answer under the Ninth Circuit test. 3
The second opportunity arose when the Court, in Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S.
59 (1958), was faced with the Second Circuit disallowance of a deduction for construction workers. The circuit court contended that the employment was indefinite and
thereby taxpayers' "tax home" traveled with them to work leaving the taxpayer no home
to be away from. The Supreme Court in a short opinion affirming the decision, did not
consider that a challenge to the temporary-indefinite test was before them and assumed,
without deciding, the validity of both the rule and the lower court's factual determination that the employment involved was not temporary.
35 See e.g. Huffaker, "Away from Home," as a Tax Concept, N.Y.U. 22ND INST.
ON FED. TAx. 869 (1964); Haddleton, Traveling Expenses "Away From Home," 17
TAx L. REv. 261 (1962); Note, A House Is Not A Tax Home, 49 VA. L. REv. 125

(1963); 53 IowA L. REv. 227 (1967); 20 Sw. L.J. 676 (1966).
86 Rev. Rul. 63-239, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 87. The Commissioner has applied the
test that the cost of meals is a deductible expense providing the taxpayer is away from
home overnight. The First, Fifth and Eighth Circuits have rejected the overnight rule
and find it to be without legislative support. MERTENS §§ 25, 334, 344.
87 Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 60, 64. "The Service will normally raise no
question concerning the temporary nature of an employment or stay at a particular
location if both its anticipated and actual durations are for less than one year.
8 Consider the following hypothetical:
Taxpayer has a wife and eight children. He lives in a large but unusual house
especially built for his family and it's needs. Taxpayer and his family have deep
roots in their town which is also known for its fine schools. Taxpayer accepts
a new job with a company located 150 miles away in the middle of a vast
industrial metropolitan complex where housing is very expensive and schools
are poor. Taxpayer can do part of his work in his home and, therefore, needs
to go to the company office only three days a week. In such a case it might
well be that taxpayer could not be "reasonably expected to move his home."
Add the fact that taxpayer's wife threatens to divorce him if he insists on
moving and the case is clearer. Many other similar situations can easily be
imagined where, for strictly personal reasons, a man might not be expected
to move. In such cases should expenses incurred on trips to the company's
location be deductible?
Comment, CCH FaD. TAx CURRENT LAW & PRAcTICE 735 (1966).
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The Supreme Court should take a middle course between the views
of the Ninth Circuit and the Commissioner in determining a taxpayer's "tax home." The basic idea that home is one's principal place
of business should be maintained, but the temporary-indefinite test
should be rejected. The Court should determine that if the change is
permanent, rather than indefinite, the principal place of business
moves to the new job site. The Court's statement in Stidger, that
there is a separate standard of permanency for the civilian and
military, indicates a realization on the part of the majority that a test
of permanent employment should be devised and applied to determine whether the employee's principal place of business has in fact
moved. Permanency should be determined by all the facts and circumstances of the case, including: (1) whether the taxpayer can take
his family with him; (2) whether he is paid a per diem allowance or
otherwise reimbursed for his expenses; (3) whether the employer
considers the change to be temporary or permanent; and (4) the
particular type of employment of the taxpayer, as it bears on what
is considered temporary or permanent employment in his particular
trade or business. The presence or absence of any one of these factors
would not be a conclusive determination as to a shift of the taxpayer's
home. The following is an example of the temporary-permanenttest
in practice: A civilian taxpayer is transferred to a job site 100 miles
from his former place of employment and his residence. The taxpayer has no idea how long the transfer will be effective. The employer pays the taxpayer per diem for a period of 16 months. The
employee, during this period, makes weekly trips to see his family,
which are not reimbursed by the employer. At the end of the 16
months, the employer informs the taxpayer that the change is permanent.
Under the temporary-permanent test, the employee's principal
place of business remained, for 16 months, at his former job site.
This allows exemption of the per diem under the "away from home"
clause. In this situation, cessation of the per diem after only 2 months
at the new job site would tend to show that the change was permanent
at this point and the "tax home" would move to the new job absent
proof by the employee that the transfer was in fact only temporary.
This test will alleviate the hardships caused by the temporary-indefinite test, without disturbing the obvious value of the "tax home"
doctrine.
CHARLES R. KhouRY, JR.

